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INTRODUCTION
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,”1 Chief Justice John Marshall opined in the famous
nineteenth century judicial review-affirming case, Marbury v. Madison. Yet
often forgotten and seldom mentioned is Marshall’s immediately suc-
ceeding sentence: “Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule.”2
What thus emerged as a fairly uncontroversial assertion of historically
grounded judicial power3—the ability of the judiciary to voluntarily choose
not to give effect to a duly enacted congressional statute, in a particular
Article III case or controversy, if the statute is deemed by the bench to run
afoul of the US Constitution—somehow transmogrified into something
much more insidious. In the 1958 case of Cooper v. Aaron,4 the court, for
the first time, latched onto Marbury to unequivocally pronounce the doc-
trine that we today recognize as judicial supremacy: “[Marbury] declared
the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been by this
court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our con-
stitutional system.”5 The Cooper court thus directly conflated its own inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, made four years earlier in the
landmark school desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education,6 with
the requirements of the Constitution’s supremacy clause7 itself. Today, few
seriously contest that such judicial supremacist views dominate in both the
legal academy and the political arena.8
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 247
(2007) ( “John Marshall’s 1803 defense of the power of judicial review drew little negative com-
ment . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable variance between [a constitution and any particular act proceeding from the legisla-
tive body], that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or,
in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to
the intention of their agents.”); accord Robert M. Casale, Revisiting One of the Law’s Great
Fallacies: Marbury v. Madison, 89 CONN. B.J. 62, 64 (2015) (arguing that Marbury “articulated a
persuasive justification for an existing judicial practice that was anticipated by the framers of the
Constitution, previously acknowledged by justices of the Supreme Court, and regularly exercised
by state courts.”).
4. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
5. Id. at 18.
6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. See, e.g., Ronald J. Pestritto, MODERN AMERICA AND THE LEGACY OF THE FOUNDING 67
(2007) (“[S]ince the late 1970s, most liberal judges and constitutional scholars have assumed that
federal courts ought to be supreme interpreters of the Constitution . . .”); see also WHITTINGTON,
supra note 3, at 280–81 (explaining how even the conservative Rehnquist Court, in the context of
its federalism and Commerce Clause jurisprudence, emphasized judicial supremacist norms).
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And yet, rather than simply having one interpretive method intrinsi-
cally required by either constitutional structure or the Article III text as the
Cooper court claimed, “the construction of th[e] authority to interpret the
Constitution does not stand outside of politics . . . but rather occurs within
American political development.”9 In June 2015, the Supreme Court consti-
tutionalized same-sex nuptials in Obergefell v. Hodges.10 A bitterly split
five-to-four decision that mostly rested not on slightly more plausible equal
protection grounds but rather on less defensible substantive due process
grounds, Obergefell left most originalists, and certainly all social conserva-
tives, somewhere between jurisprudentially frustrated and positively
aghast.11 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts bluntly said that “[the Constitu-
tion] had nothing to do with [the ruling]”;12 Justice Scalia called it “a naked
judicial claim to legislative . . . power; a claim fundamentally at odds with
our system of government”;13 and Justice Thomas said the opinion “exalts
judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their
authority.”14
Rather than merely accede to the court’s latest diktat, some conserva-
tive legal scholars saw fit to push back against the judicial supremacist tide.
On October 8, 2015, the American Principles Project, a conservative think
tank co-founded by Princeton University McCormick Professor of Jurispru-
dence Robert P. George15 and former presidential speechwriter and Repub-
lican US Senate candidate Jeffrey Bell, released a powerful “Statement
Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v. Hodges” (hereinafter
referred to as the “APP Statement,” or sometimes merely as the “State-
ment”).16 The APP Statement brutalizes the Obergefell majority opinion17
and is unabashed in its assault on judicial supremacy and on the claimed
authority of the Supreme Court to definitively settle the marriage question
for the entire nation.18 The Statement then cites canonical passages by
9. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 292.
10. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
11. See, e.g., Caitlin La Ruffa, After Obergefell: A First Things Symposium, FIRST THINGS
(June 27, 2015), http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2015/06/after-obergefell-a-first-
things-symposium (“Well, we got the Roe v. Wade of marriage. As much as we’d been expecting
it, it’s still surprisingly hard to swallow.”).
12. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15. See People, PRINCETON U., http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/people/george.html.
16. Bradley C.S. Watson et al., Statement Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell
v. Hodges, AQUILA REP. (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.theaquilareport.com/statement-calling-for-
constitutional-resistance-to-obergefell-v-hodges%E2%80%AF.
17. Id. (“The opinion for the Court substituted for traditional—and sound—methods of con-
stitutional interpretation a new and ill-defined jurisprudence of identity—one that abused the
moral concept of human dignity. . . . The four dissenting justices are right to reject the majority
opinion in unsparing terms.”).
18. Id. (“Any decision . . . lacking anything remotely resembling a warrant in the text, logic,
structure, or original understanding of the Constitution must be judged anti-constitutional and
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James Madison19 and Abraham Lincoln20 in order to argue that (1) the Con-
stitution is not what a majority of sitting Supreme Court justices says it is;
(2) all US officeholders hold an oath to uphold the US Constitution, not the
will of five members of the Supreme Court; and (3) all federal and state
officeholders should (a) refuse to accept and apply Obergefell for any par-
ties except those party to the litigation, (b) recognize the authority of states
to define marriage, (c) pledge full and mutual legal and political assistance
to anyone who refuses to follow Obergefell for constitutionally protected
reasons, and (d) open a conversation on the means by which Americans
may “constitutionally resist and overturn the judicial usurpations evident in
Obergefell.”21 The Statement ends with a solemn warning against treating
the same-sex marriage issue as “settled” and “the law of the land.”22
This paper does not directly address Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.
As such, I will discuss at length the underlying merits of neither Brown nor
Obergefell. What I will discuss, however, is whether the phenomenon of
judicial supremacy is principled or justifiable, and how the phenomenon has
evolved in constitutional history so as to make statements like the APP’s so
contemporarily very rare.
Part I of the paper will technically analyze the APP Statement. The
analysis will address all of the Statement’s most controversial elements: its
rejection of “horizontal” judicial supremacy over Congress and the execu-
tive branch, its rejection of “vertical” judicial supremacy over state and lo-
cal officeholders, and its argument to only maintain the Obergefell ruling as
an ad hoc judgment, rather than as a broader political rule to be accepted
and applied by all federal and state courts. Part I is intended as more of a
proffered justification than a full-on apologia.
illegitimate. Obergefell should be declared to be such, and treated as such, by the other branches
of government and by citizens of the United States.”).
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (“The several departments being perfectly co-
ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to
an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers . . . .”).
20. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861) (“I do not forget the position
assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I
deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of
that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by
other departments of the Government. And while it is obviously possible that such decision may
be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular
case, with the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can
better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the same time, the candid citizen
must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people
is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary
litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers,
having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal.”).
21. Watson et al., supra note 16.
22. Id. For a broad overview of many of the possible federal and state mechanisms by which
to resist or refute Obergefell, see generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Checking the Court, 10
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 18 (2016).
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Part II of the paper will compare the APP Statement with a superfi-
cially logical predecessor, the 1956 Declaration of Constitutional Principles
(hereinafter, the “Southern Manifesto”), which was co-written by segrega-
tionist US Senators Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Richard Rus-
sell, Jr. of Georgia in response to Brown. While the APP Statement
unambiguously goes further than the Manifesto does in its assault on judi-
cial supremacy, I will offer two key reasons why the APP Statement is
more normatively defensible from the perspective of political constitution-
alism: the sharply divided nature of the court’s ruling in Obergefell and
crucial historical differences between the development of antimiscegenation
laws in the US and the political rise of same-sex marriage.
Finally, in Part III, I will explore reasons why statements such as the
APP’s have been so rare. I will offer five reasons, which range from the
more speculative to the more empirically grounded. First, judicial
supremacy was already accepted by many political actors throughout Amer-
ican history pre-Manifesto and had become widely accepted by the time of
the Manifesto and Cooper. Second, the post-Carolene Products23 footnote
four/post-Warren court legal professoriate and political elite have suffi-
ciently promoted an idealistic vision of the countermajoritarian, rights-pro-
tecting judiciary so as to largely cabin strongly antijudicial supremacy
sentiment to ardent social conservatives. Third, in the eyes of many, the
procedural judicial supremacy debate today is unfortunately largely inextri-
cable from the substantive segregationist debate of the 1950s. Fourth, in a
constitutional landscape increasingly driven by functionalist concerns, there
are worthy pragmatic reasons to support judicial supremacy. Fifth, the life
tenure of the justices may promote the court’s institutional interests in such
a way so as to better enable the aggrandizement of power relative to Con-
gress and the executive branch.
I. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, DEPARTMENTALISM, AND POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE APP STATEMENT
Marbury’s assertion of the judicial power to not lend authority to un-
constitutional statutes amounted to a sizable victory for “the least dangerous
branch,”24 but it is an implausible stretch to claim Marbury supports—let
alone requires, as the Cooper court did—the far broader claim of judicial
supremacy.25 Chief Justice Marshall grounds his holding in Marbury, which
23. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
24. Hamilton, supra note 3.
25. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2706, 2708–09, 15 (2003) ( “[T]he Framers understood to be the power of judicial review: a
coordinate, coequal power of courts to judge for themselves the conformity of acts of the other
two branches with the fundamental law of the Constitution, and to refuse to give acts contradicting
the Constitution any force or effect insofar as application of the judicial power is concerned. . . .
Nothing in Marbury supports the modern myth of judicial supremacy in interpretation of the
Constitution. Quite the contrary . . . it is a huge and illogical stretch, one certainly not warranted
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famously established for the first time the principle of judicial review, in
three core arguments: (1) there is constitutional supremacy, (2) constitu-
tional supremacy cannot be reconciled with the ability of one branch to
definitively bind another to its possibly erroneous constitutional interpreta-
tions, and (3) a public official’s oath to support the Constitution necessitates
direct recourse to the document itself.26 The superiority of the written Con-
stitution over inconsistent subsequent actions of government requires un-
questioned fidelity to the former at the expense of the latter—a notion
intrinsic in the very nature of the founding generation’s decision to physi-
cally write a durable governing charter. Far from requiring judicial
supremacy, a proper understanding of Marshall’s holding, therefore, actu-
ally necessitates rejecting it; just as the judiciary must not feel bound by
Congress’s idiosyncratically incorrect constitutional prognostications, so
Congress must not feel strictly bound by the judiciary’s idiosyncratically
incorrect interpretations.27 The same, of course, is true for the presidency;28
quite simply put, presidents interpret the Constitution all the time in the
course of their quotidian work.29
Indeed, given the very nature of the Madisonian separation of powers
and the elaborate system of checks and balances, it was likely understood
that “the justices should allocate interpretive authority over the Constitution
in a manner that respects the stature of the other branches as coordinate and
independent branches.”30 The entire edifice of the federal government was
designed so that “ambition [would] be made to counteract ambition”;31 the
very notion of one branch blindly succumbing to the will of a different
by the ‘emphatically the province’ sentence [in Marbury] and indeed quite inconsistent with the
rest of Marshall’s argument, to move from the proposition that the courts are competent to deter-
mine constitutional cases to the proposition that the courts’ views bind everybody else.”).
26. Id. at 2711–12.
27. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 911–12
(1989) (“Legislators may vote for a bill that the Court has held unconstitutional, in order to
prompt change . . . [and l]egislation that bumps against accepted [judicial] bounds is a force for
change as legitimate as the arguments of lawyers who try to curtail governmental powers by
asking for the invalidation of laws previously sustained.”).
28. See Paulsen, supra note 25, at 2718 (“[T]here is no more reason in principle—and none
remotely suggested in the pages of Marbury—for Branch X to be bound by Branch Y’s errors
than for Branch Z to be bound by Branch X’s.”); accord Paulsen, supra note 25, at 2726 (“[T]he
President may, indeed must, refuse to execute or carry out a decision of the judiciary that exceeds
the limits the Constitution has imposed on that branch.”).
29. For one particularly noteworthy recent example, consider President Barack Obama’s de-
cision to implicitly conclude that § 1035 of the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, § 8111
of the Fiscal Year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, and the Anti-Deficiency Act were all
unconstitutional infringements on his Article II Commander in Chief prerogative—and thus unen-
forceable—in the context of his controversial May 2014 prisoner swap involving Sergeant Bowe
Bergdahl. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Was the Bergdahl Swap Lawful?, LAWFARE (Mar. 25, 2015,
9:19 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/was-bergdahl-swap-lawful.
30. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29
(2011).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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branch was anathema. Thomas Jefferson, perhaps the earliest clarion expo-
nent of departmentalism, asserted that “[to] give[ ] to the judges the right to
decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves
in their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive also, in
their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.”32 And the
founding generation, which fought a bloody revolution precisely to break
away from a power-hungry and rights-undermining monarch, had no inter-
est in returning to despotism of any kind.
If the “least dangerous branch”—that which has “neither FORCE nor
WILL, but merely judgment,” in the Hamiltonian formulation—does not
bind the other branches so as to undermine the political branches’ discrete
spheres of autonomy, then the judiciary must necessarily “depend upon the
aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”33 The take
care clause34 and the presidential oath35 impress upon the president serious
custodial duties with respect to the Constitution,36 but, importantly, there is
nothing in “the laws” to which the take care clause refers that includes the
judiciary’s sweeping constitutional prognostications. The APP Statement
writers concede that Obergefell should be enforced insofar as parties to the
suit are involved, thus rendering superfluous Lincoln’s famous defiance of
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney’s specific circuit court judgment
in Ex parte Merryman.37 But what is structurally inconceivable is that the
framers might have imposed such solemn obligations of constitutional faith-
fulness upon the president whilst simultaneously requiring that he not inter-
pret the Constitution for himself but instead merely accept the judiciary’s
word for it.
Far from being required by constitutional text, structure, or even from
Marshall’s ruling in Marbury, the scope over who gets to properly interpret
the Constitution has been an ongoing political tug-of-war throughout Amer-
ican history.38 Just as Presidents Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson39
espoused departmentalist views that ultimately culminated in Lincoln’s di-
32. Mark C. Rahdert & Robert J. Reinstein, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729,
755–56 n.135 (2005) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804),
in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 51 (Albert Ellery Bergh, ed., 1905)).
33. Hamilton, supra note 3.
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
36. Indeed, one might easily read the text of the presidential oath and think that the executive
branch is the singular branch most firmly entrusted to defend the Constitution.
37. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
38. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 3.
39. See Tim Alan Garrison, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 20,
2018), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/worcester-v-georgia-
1832 (“Although Jackson is widely quoted as saying, ‘John Marshall has made his decision; now
let him enforce it,’ his actual words to Brigadier General John Coffee were: ‘The decision of the
supreme court has fell still born, and they find that it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its
mandate.’”).
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rect defiance of Dred Scott40 and hitherto unprecedented assault on judicial
power41 in Ex parte Merryman, so have many other national politicians
advanced judicial supremacist sentiments when it was seen as beneficial for
either their political careers or for the country.42 For example, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s sending federal troops into Little Rock in 1957
and his ultimate decision to support the Cooper court’s claimed judicial
supremacy in 1958 can be seen as a distinctly political solution to a notable
episode in the long-running interpretive tug of war. It is noteworthy that the
circular reasoning of the Cooper court necessarily required Eisenhower’s
independent enforcement decision in order to have any teeth.43 The feared
“despotism of an oligarchy,”44 against which Lincoln warned in his debates
with Stephen Douglas, thus actually requires45 the coordinated enforcement
mechanism of the executive branch in order to render a judicial ruling more
than a de facto advisory opinion.
The APP Statement, of course, goes beyond merely rejecting judicial
supremacy and calling for departmentalism among the three branches of the
federal government. Specifically, the Statement explicitly exhorts upon “all
40. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
41. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1227, 1285–95 (2008); but see Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor
Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (1999) (disagreeing with Paulsen—and thus Lincoln—on the
scope of the president’s ability to refuse to enforce specific judgments in cases or controversies
that he deems unconstitutional).
42. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 255–56 (arguing that amidst the post-Civil War
economic strife and political partisanship, judicial authority was welcomed as a harmonizing
force); accord WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 274 (“Turning to the judiciary as an alternative
forum for advancing constitutional goals is frequently a necessity if political coalitions from their
origins are fragmented or insecure or if coalition partners disagree not just about one (perhaps big)
issue such as slavery but myriad issues.”).
43. Importantly, Eisenhower’s decision to send federal troops into Little Rock predated
Cooper by one year; this might have bolstered the Cooper Court’s faith in executive enforcement
of its claimed interpretive supremacy. Though some see Eisenhower’s decision to send in federal
troops to Little Rock in 1957 as “the extent of his support of Brown,” he did follow Brown by
immediately exercising his direct authority over the District of Columbia to order desegregation of
the public schools there. Judith A. Hagley, Massive Resistance—The Rhetoric and the Reality, 27
N.M. L. REV. 167, 187–88 (1997). Moreover, Eisenhower’s decision to enforce Brown via send-
ing in federal troops was anathema to his policy preferences, since “by all accounts, Eisenhower
was unenthusiastic about . . . Brown”; instead, Eisenhower felt (perhaps erroneously: see supra
note 28–29) that “[his] personal opinions about the [Brown] decision have no bearing on the
matter of enforcement.” Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal
Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1175 (2011).
44. Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1250.
45. To be clear, most judicial judgments will be readily accepted, and such deference is
probably appropriate. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 3–4 (quoting City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997) (“Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is
preserved best when each part of the government respects both the Constitution and the proper
actions and determinations of the other branches.”)). But if a judgment is resisted, then the simple
truth remains that the judiciary has no enforcement mechanism of its own. Even the U.S. Marshals
Service, borne out of the incipient Judiciary Act of 1789, is hierarchically housed within the
Executive Branch’s U.S. Department of Justice.
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federal and state officeholders” to refuse to accept Obergefell as binding
beyond the specific named parties to the suit.46 With “officeholder” being
most naturally read to mean “public official,” it must be conceded that the
APP Statement thus includes under its aegis not only state legislators, gov-
ernors, and other government functionaries, but also other federal and state
judges.
US Supreme Court justices can, of course, overturn their own deci-
sions. But for the judges of the lower federal courts, are they strictly bound
by Supreme Court rulings under either a structurally required Article III
hierarchy or by stare decisis? Recall that Marbury’s ultimate holding is one
of constitutional (i.e. not judicial) supremacy: the Constitution must reign
supreme over conflicting interpretations. There is no compelling textual or
structural reason for distinguishing between statutes and judicial interpreta-
tions: a mistaken interpretation is a mistaken interpretation. If one takes
Marbury and the logic of the oath to uphold the Constitution seriously, then
it is very difficult to escape the conclusion that stare decisis in constitu-
tional interpretation—“the idea that courts should (as they sometimes say
they do, and as they sometimes, in fact, do) adhere to the principles of prior
cases even when persuaded that those principles are wrong as a matter of
the correct interpretation of the Constitution or other controlling federal
law”47—is not only unjustified but is anticonstitutional. To find otherwise
is to subordinate the requirements of a judge’s oath48 for a conclusion49
allegedly inherent from the federal judiciary’s very structure.50 As Michael
Stokes Paulsen argues, “[lower court judges] can, and should, make the
Supreme Court do its own dirty work.”51
46. Watson et al., supra note 16.
47. Paulsen, supra note 25, at 2733.
48. The Founding generation took its oaths quite seriously. See, e.g., FRANK LAMBERT, THE
FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 2 (Princeton University Press 2003)
(directly linking the Puritans’ governing oaths, which meant to ensure that “only godly Christians
[would] rule,” to George Washington’s oath a century and a half later to “faithfully execute the
office of the President of the United States” and to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
of the United States.”).
49. Namely, that lower court federal judges are necessarily always bound by the constitu-
tional interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court.
50. See Paulsen, supra note 25, at 2734 (positing that the words “supreme” and “inferior” in
Article III do not necessarily imply anything more than a hierarchy by which a higher court can
review and possibly reverse a lower court’s judgment); accord Paulsen, supra note 22, at 25
(“[L]ower federal court judges are [not] mere subordinate functionaries of the Supreme Court.
Rather, they are constitutionally independent judicial officers responsible for their own decisions.
Their decisions can be reversed—if the chain of appellate hierarchy controlled by Congress so
provides. But even where that is the case, it does not transform lower court judges into flunkies of
the Supreme Court; their duty, too, is the faithful interpretation and application of the Constitu-
tion—no matter what the Supreme Court may have said to the contrary.”); accord Paulsen, supra
note 22, at 29 (arguing that lower federal court judges should not be thought of as “subordinates”
of Supreme Court justices).
51. Paulsen, supra note 25, at 2734.
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The power of state officeholders to meaningfully challenge or flout the
federal judiciary’s constitutional prognostications is perhaps a historically
and politically fraught topic in which to delve. Many will instinctively think
of Jefferson and Madison’s famous Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of
1798–99, which arguably established the intellectual foundation for South
Carolina’s nullification crisis during the presidency of Andrew Jackson and
perhaps for John C. Calhoun-style nullification theory more broadly. But
intellectual honesty demands that, for purposes of the Constitution’s
supremacy clause, we distinguish between congressional legislation and ju-
dicial prognostications; while the supremacy of the former over the states’
contrary legislation was assuredly one of the underlying motivations of the
supremacy clause,52 the latter does not neatly fit within the clause’s ambit
unless one casually conflates a judicial decree with being an unambiguous
“law of the land.”53 Simply put, the textualist argument that an Article III
judicial decree amounts to a “Law[ ] of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]”54 is tenuous at best.55 By contrast,
judicial review in the early years of the republic was “aimed primarily at
[the disparate] state legislatures.”56
State constitutional defiance of the federal government may under-
standably raise some eyebrows due to the historical invocations of “states’
rights” to push for more historically troubling theories such as “nullifica-
tion” of federal statutes, “[b]ut the correctness of a constitutional theory
cannot be judged by its misappropriation and misapplication by constitu-
tional hijackers.”57 Two already discussed themes do indeed support such
an independent prerogative amongst state and local government officials,
including judges, to interpret the Constitution for themselves: Marbury’s
emphasis on constitutional (i.e., not judicial) supremacy, and the solemnity
of the oath of public office.58 Skeptics will complain of the pragmatic and
“rule of law” shortcomings of such a theory of decentralized constitutional
interpretation (more on that in Part III, infra), but “[t]he true question is
whether the Constitution provides for a multiplicity of interpreters, each
52. The clause’s text unambiguously demands the “suprem[acy]” of “Laws . . . made in
Pursuance” of the Constitution over the “laws of any State to the Contrary . . . .” U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2.
53. Professor Paulsen persuasively argues that this is simply anathematic to Chief Justice
Marshall’s very narrow holding in Marbury—which, contrary to so much popular opinion, goes to
lengths to reject the notion that an act of judicial review establishes a binding principle as “law of
the land.” See Paulsen, supra note 25.
54. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
55. This logic applies just as easily for the U.S. Supreme Court as it does for Article III lower
courts.
56. R. Kent Newmyer, Chief Justice Marshall in the Context of His Times, 56 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 841, 846 (1999).
57. Paulsen, supra note 25, at 2734.
58. See id. at 2736 (“Marbury makes as much of the idea of constitutional supremacy, and of
the obligation of the oath, as it does the coordinacy of the branches of the federal government.”).
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independent of the others and armed with only a portion of the constitu-
tional power to make their interpretations stick, or instead provides for a
single authoritative interpreter whose decisions are conclusive and binding
on all other actors, even where they are wrong—contrary to the written
Constitution that is our paramount law—and even where they are
wicked.”59 While many today might intuitively harbor a greater fear for the
former, Lincoln60 and, indeed, Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury,61 were
more concerned with the latter. And to clarify, from the perspective of state
constitutional actors, the obedience requirements of the supremacy clause
are much more clearly not invoked when considering federal judicial de-
crees than when considering congressional legislation; in other words, one
can accept an independent prerogative of state legislative and judicial actors
to refuse to blindly accept as a binding political principle a misguided fed-
eral judicial ruling without fully summoning the ghost of John C. Calhoun
and disinterring the antebellum “nullification” debate.
Since judicial supremacy—defined as rote obedience to the US Su-
preme Court as the singular and unequivocal expositor of constitutional in-
terpretation by means of a willful conflation between “the Constitution” and
“what a majority of the court says about the Constitution”—is not textually
required and is actually anathematic to Marbury’s common-sense affirma-
tion of The Federalist No. 78,62 the historical ebbing and flowing of judicial
supremacist and popular constitutionalist63 sentiment has largely been
driven not by black-letter legalism but by what University of Virginia polit-
ical scientist James Ceasar calls “political constitutionalism.”64 In this
framework, no less an event than the US Civil War can actually be under-
stood as (amongst many other things) an instance of constitutional interpre-
tation: General Robert E. Lee’s April 1865 surrender to General Ulysses S.
Grant at Appomattox Court House “resolved the most important issue of
59. Id. at 2737; accord Paulsen, supra note 22, at 28–29 (positing that lower federal court
and state court judges do indeed “possess independent constitutional authority and the indepen-
dent duty to decide matters of federal law faithfully to the U.S. Constitution.”).
60. Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1243–67 (detailing at length Lincoln’s staunch opposition to
judicial supremacy, in the context of his famous 1858 debates with Stephen Douglas).
61. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (stating that opposition to
constitutional supremacy, and concomitant acceptance of legislative (or any other form of)
supremacy, “would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions”).
62. See Hamilton, supra note 3.
63. I am defining “popular constitutionalism” here as simply meaning large-scale constitu-
tional interpretation outside the courts. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The
Tea Party Movement and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2012).
64. See Yuval Levin, How Our Democracy Works, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www
.nationalreview.com/corner/393244/how-our-democracy-works-yuval-levin (quoting Ceasar for
the proposition that the Constitution must be understood in terms of both “legal constitutionalism”
and “political constitutionalism,” where the latter “. . . understands the Constitution as a document
that fixes certain ends of government activity, delineates a structure and arrangement of powers,
. . . encourages a certain tone to the operation of the institutions . . . [and under which] it falls
mostly to political actors making political decisions to protect and promote constitutional goals”).
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antebellum constitutional dispute—the nature of the Union—in favor of the
nationalist view of sovereignty and against the South’s state-sovereignty
view.”65 Similarly, just as Lincoln’s rejection of Dred Scott as binding prin-
ciple and utter defiance of Chief Justice Taney’s specific judgment in Ex
parte Merryman may be seen as long-term “political constitutionalism” vic-
tories for departmentalism, so may Eisenhower’s perception of feeling
bound by the Brown court and concomitant decision to send in federal
troops to Little Rock66 be seen as a “political constitutionalism” victory for
judicial supremacy.
In the aftermath of Obergefell and the APP Statement, at least one
state court has grappled with all of these raised issues. In November 2015,
the Mississippi Supreme Court considered a routine motion for an entry of
judgment that was filed by a same-sex couple seeking to have the state’s
highest court instruct a chancery court to exercise subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over its divorce proceeding.67 Though the motion was successful, the
court order was notable for its three acerbic dissents.
Dissenting, Presiding Justice Jess Dickinson positively quoted the
Obergefell dissenters and the APP Statement itself68 to argue that “it indeed
is possible for the United States Supreme Court to render an opinion so
devoid of constitutional analysis or reason, that it exceeds not only the au-
thority granted itself in Marbury, but also the court’s authority under Arti-
cle III of the United States Constitution.”69 Dickinson also explicitly
grounded his own oath of office as being to the Constitution itself; he
foreswore that he had any “oath to follow decisions that have ‘no basis in
the Constitution.’”70 Justice Leslie King, also dissenting to the order, saw
fit to point out that the US Supreme Court only directly held unconstitu-
tional the state laws of the states before it in the Obergefell litigation: Mich-
65. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 691, 691 (2004) (reviewing DANIEL FABER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003)); accord Paul-
sen, supra note 25, at 2736 n.85 (arguing in favor of an independent state ability to interpret the
Constitution but also noting that “the existence of such state interpretive power surely does not
bind the organs of federal government, which may properly resist state misinterpretations or
abuses of the Constitution with all the power at their disposal, in order to correct such state
departures from the Constitution. See, e.g., Grant v. Lee (Appomattox Court House, Apr. 1865).”).
66. See supra note 42. Eisenhower’s enforcement of Brown, as well as his response to the
Southern Manifesto by “offer[ing a] hearty endorsement[ ] of judicial supremacy,” perhaps moti-
vated the Court’s ultimate unabashed claim of judicial supremacy in Cooper—which Eisenhower
also then supported. See Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV.
1053, 1102 (2014).
67. Order Granting Motion for an Entry of Judgment, Czekala-Chatham v. Mississippi ex rel.
Hood, 195 So. 3d 187 (Miss. 2015) (No. 2014-CA-00008-SCT).
68. Justice Dickinson actually saw fit to list by name thirty-one of the Statement’s signees.
69. Czekala-Chatham, 195 So. 3d at 189–93 (Dickinson, J., objecting).
70. Id. para. 14, at 190 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Rob-
erts, C.J., dissenting)).
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igan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.71 Finally, Justice Josiah Coleman
quoted The Federalist No. 78, Justice Benjamin Curtis’s famous Dred Scott
dissent, and (at length) Cooper in order to argue both against the notion that
Marbury established judicial supremacy72 and in favor of the notion that
blind obedience to the US Supreme Court’s Obergefell diktat cannot be
reconciled with the Mississippi judicial oath to “faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon [them] . . . agreeably
to the Constitution of the United States.”73
The Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision to order the chancery court
to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the same-sex couple’s post-
Obergefell divorce necessarily obviated the need for President Obama to
emulate Eisenhower’s strong-handedness by sending federal troops into
Mississippi. Thus a minor victory was achieved for judicial supremacists in
their ongoing political tug of war with departmentalists and popular
constitutionalists.
II. THE APP STATEMENT AND THE SOUTHERN MANIFESTO
The APP Statement is notable, in part, for being one of the most pow-
erful and nationally prominent74 antijudicial authority proclamations since
the 1956 Southern Manifesto.75 Before considering possible explanations
for the long-term triumph of judicial supremacy within both the legal acad-
emy and the political arena, then, it is worth considering how the APP
Statement and the Manifesto are similar and how they are different.
Like the APP Statement, and despite its unfortunate historical stature
as having stood athwart a Supreme Court decision now all but universally
viewed as a landmark civil rights achievement, the Manifesto “offers an
71. Id. para. 18, at 198 (King, J., objecting) (stating opposition to viewing specific judgments
as binding national political rules that is similar to the stance Lincoln took in his first inaugural
address in arguing that the judgment in Dred Scott should only be applied to Dred Scott himself; it
is also similar to the stance of the APP Statement signees in arguing that Obergefell should only
apply to the specific plaintiffs in the litigation).
72. Id. para. 10, at 202–03 (Coleman, J., objecting) (quoting Robert Lowry Clinton, How the
Court Became Supreme, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 1, 1999), http://www.firstthings.com/article/1999/01/
001-how-the-court-became-supreme).
73. Id. para. 7, at 201 (quoting MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 155).
74. The Manifesto was indubitably more attention grabbing, but the APP Statement signees
include many nationally prominent legal scholars. Robert P. George, for instance, who is widely
viewed as the lead drafter of the Statement, was once described by The New York Times Magazine
as “this country’s most influential conservative Christian thinker.” David D. Kirkpatrick, The
Conservative-Christian Big Thinker, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
12/20/magazine/20george-t.html.
75. The full text of the Manifesto, which was first introduced in a speech on the House floor
on March 12, 1956 by Rep. Howard Smith (D-Va.) before Sen. Walter George (D-Ga.) introduced
an identical version in the Senate (see Andrew Glass, Southern Manifesto Introduced, March 12,
1956, POLITICO (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.politico.com/story/2009/03/southern-manifesto-intro-
duced-march-12-1956-019897). For a record of the Manifesto’s recitation in Congress, see The
Southern Manifesto, 102 CONG. REC. 3948 (1956), reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 435–37
(1956).
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unusually articulate example of constitutional interpretation outside of the
courts.”76 Indeed, rather than being filled with racist vitriol, the Manifesto
“chiefly consisted of lawyerly arguments about constitutional meaning.”77
The Manifesto argued that Brown was wrongly decided on the Fourteenth
Amendment merits, that the question of segregation was properly a state
issue pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, and that “all lawful means” should
be used to “bring about a reversal of [Brown,] which is contrary to the
Constitution.”78 Perhaps anticipating Eisenhower’s decision to send in fed-
eral troops to Little Rock, the Manifesto also sought to “prevent the use of
force in [Brown’s] implementation.”79
The Manifesto’s language was certainly strong in its opposition to the
unanimous Brown court—though perhaps no stronger than the vociferous
words of the four dissenting justices in Obergefell. The Manifesto’s sev-
enty-seven House members and nineteen senators condemned the Brown
court’s “clear abuse of judicial power” and decried the “climax[ed] . . .
trend in the Federal Judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the
authority of Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the
States and the people.”80 Former South Carolina Representative L. Mendel
Rivers went so far as to call the US Supreme Court a “greater threat to this
Union than the entire confines of Soviet Russia.”81 Indeed, the great twenti-
eth century constitutional law scholar Alexander Bickel referred to the
Manifesto as a “calculated declaration of political war against the court’s
decision.”82 Yet all the while, most Manifesto signatories were circumspect
not to purposefully foment violence or unrest across the South.83
The most salient technical difference between the APP Statement and
the Manifesto is that, while the APP Statement overtly calls for complete
rejection of judicial supremacy, the Manifesto’s urging of Southerners to
76. Driver, supra note 66, at 1057.
77. Id. at 1063 (“[M]any contemporary observers instead praised the document for demon-
strating moderation, restraint, and also for avoiding inflammatory and emotional rhetoric.”); see
also id. at 1067 (mentioning that The Wall Street Journal even noted that “the Manifesto was ‘not
the voice of any calloused demagog’ [sic]”); Bert Brandenburg, Brown v. Board of Education and
Attacks on the Courts Fifty Years Ago, Fifty Years Later, JUSTICE AT STAKE, 66, 72 (2008).
78. Driver, supra note 66, at 1066.
79. Id. at 1066–67. But see Hagley, supra note 43, at 190 (arguing that this portion of the
Manifesto arguably “made resistance to the federal courts respectable across the South and sig-
naled that there would be no federal retribution for defiance of Brown”).
80. Robert Justin Lipkin, Which Constitution? Who Decides? The Problem of Judicial
Supremacy and the Interbranch Solution, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1055, 1115–16 (2006).
81. Brandenburg, supra note 77, at 70.
82. Hagley, supra note 43, at 189 n.162 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 256 (1962)).
83. See, e.g., Driver, supra note 66, at 1066–67; see, e.g., Driver, supra note 66, at 1088
(quoting Ellender Warns South Not to Use Violence in Resisting Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
1956, at 87) (Louisiana Senator Allen Ellender’s “sober warning” that “[w]hat the South must
avoid at all costs is violence, lawlessness, hatred and bloodshed”).
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“resist forced integration by any lawful means”84 is largely viewed, perhaps
counterintuitively, as actually having inherently endorsed the doctrine of
judicial supremacy.85 Indeed, “the Manifesto’s eschewal of language claim-
ing that the Brown decisions were without effect bolsters the notion that the
document did not expressly disavow judicial authority and implore defi-
ance.”86 In a Senate floor colloquy with New York Senator Herbert Leh-
man, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond noted that the Manifesto’s
phrase “any lawful means” was employed “cautiously,” so as “not to imply
defiance.”87 When the Manifesto was read and discussed on the Senate
floor, no other senator made any statement “from the floor directly rejecting
[Oregon] Senator [Wayne] Morse’s [previous] articulation of judicial
supremacy,” and it is not a stretch to posit that actual respect for judicial
supremacy “even shaped the Manifesto itself.”88 Senator J. William Ful-
bright of Arkansas took a very strongly projudicial supremacy stance that
would have been excoriated by the APP Statement signees, even as he
signed the Manifesto and saw no internal contradiction whatsoever
therein.89 Many other Manifesto signees publicly expressed similar
sentiments.90
With such differing views about judicial authority, it is not surprising
that the purposes and intents of the APP Statement and Manifesto’s drafters
differ greatly. The APP Statement cites colorful portions of the Obergefell
dissenting opinions and some of the greatest expositions of departmentalism
in American history in order to argue that “all federal and state officehold-
ers” should, inter alia, “refuse to accept Obergefell as binding precedent for
all but the specific plaintiffs in that case.”91 This is, of course, a call to
directly defy the will of a majority of the US Supreme Court as to the
propriety of a constitutional dispute,92 but it is a clear-cut course of action
84. Driver, supra note 66, at 1089 (quoting 102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956)).
85. See, e.g., id. at 1091 (noting that Mississippi Senator James Eastland’s strong stance of
recalcitrant defiance, “[t]he South will not abide by nor obey this legislative decision by a political
court,” was “not representative of the attitude of most southern members of Congress during the
mid-1950s”).
86. Id. at 1093.
87. Id. at 1109 (quoting 102 CONG. REC. 5445 (1956)).
88. Id. at 1109–10; accord Friedman & Delaney, supra note 43, at 1190 (noting that despite
the Manifesto’s strong criticisms of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown, it “did not question the
Court’s power to decide the matter—only its abandonment of Plessy without ‘legal basis’”).
89. See Driver, supra note 66, at 1111 (“Under our system of government the Supreme Court
is specifically given the authority to interpret the Constitution, and no matter how wrong we think
they are, there is no appeal from their decision unless you rebel as the South tried to do in 1860.”).
90. See id. at 1112 (“[The Manifesto] does [not] repudiate the Supreme Court as the proper
body to interpret [the Constitution],” but only that they erred in Brown.).
91. Watson et al., supra note 16.
92. It is worth noting that at least one of the four Obergefell dissenters would likely have
viewed such repudiation of Obergefell as wholly justified. According to APP Statement signee
Robert P. George, Antonin Scalia was a departmentalist:
Antonin Scalia not only questioned but rejected [judicial supremacy]. And he rejected it
for the best possible reasons—Lincoln’s reasons—because it is incompatible with the
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that some APP Statement signees even long publicly stood for well before
the Obergefell ruling was promulgated.93 By contrast, the Manifesto’s
signees only “sought to influence what they acknowledged were the judici-
ary’s controlling constitutional interpretations” and did not “attempt to issue
authoritative constitutional interpretations in their own right.”94 Suffice it to
say that these suggested responses to the perceived judicial activisms of
both the Brown and Obergefell courts are miles apart. Before the APP
Statement, then, the Manifesto’s longest-lasting implication was perhaps,
ironically, that it helped “solidify[ ] the belief that acquiescence to judicial
authority forms a fundamental tenet of American civil religion.”95
Of course, the contexts for the resistances to Brown and to Obergefell
are crucial—and, specifically, are crucial in two distinct ways that help
render the APP Statement more normatively defensible as a vehicle for en-
dorsing and espousing popular constitutionalism. First, there is the impor-
tant distinction that Brown was a unanimous decision, whereas Obergefell
was a sharply divided five-to-four split. This distinction was an important
feature of the Cooper court’s claim of judicial supremacy; Cooper claimed
that the consequentialist and moral importance of yielding to the “tribunal
specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is ‘the
Supreme Law of the Land’” is particularly strong when the declaration “is
not the dubious pronouncement of a gravely divided Court[,] but is the
unanimous conclusion of a long-matured deliberative process.”96 Justice
Coleman, one of the Mississippi Supreme Court dissenters in the aforemen-
tioned Czekala-Chatham97 decision to order entry of judgment in a same-
sex divorce last November, also was careful to note the distinction: “Unlike
Brown, which was a unanimous decision, in Obergefell, four of the nine
justices—including the Chief Justice—disagreed and much more. All four
republican principles of the Constitution itself. For Scalia, as for Lincoln, the rule of law
was not the rule of judges; and a decision of the Supreme Court was the law of the case
(binding on the parties) but not necessarily the law of the land (binding on the other
branches of government).
Robert P. George, Antonin Scalia: An American Originalist, PUB. DISCOURSE (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/02/16478/.
93. See, e.g., Robert P. George, How Republicans Should Respond to a Supreme Court Mar-
riage Ruling, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2015/
03/how-republicans-should-respond-to-a-supreme-court-marriage-ruling (“[T]he Republican
Party, the Republican Congress, and a future Republican President should regard and treat the
decision just as the Republican Party, the Republican Congress, and the Republican President—
Abraham Lincoln—regarded and treated the Dred Scott decision. They should, in other words,
treat it as an anti-constitutional and illegitimate ruling in which the judiciary has attempted to
usurp the authority of the people and their elected representatives. They should refuse to treat and
regard it as a binding and settled matter.”).
94. Driver, supra note 66, at 1113.
95. Id. at 1130.
96. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24 (1958) (quoting President Andrew Jackson’s Message to
Congress of Jan. 16, 1833, reprinted in III JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 610, 623 (1896)).
97. Czekala-Chatham v. Mississippi ex rel. Hood, 195 So. 3d 187 (Miss. 2015).
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dissenters, in so many words, called the Obergefell majority an exercise of
judicial power that lacked constitutional backing.”98
To the extent that judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism
compete in a recurring tug-of-war amongst sundry public actors and institu-
tions,99 political and institutional capital are indispensable in helping to de-
termine when and where battles are best fought. By dint of the four
passionate dissents in Obergefell, the same-sex marriage decision presents a
far more logical juncture at which to expend institutional capital standing
strongly athwart judicial authority than Brown did. Obergefell featured four
distinct passionate dissenting opinions—including a vintage vituperative as-
sault by Justice Scalia on the majority’s claimed legal authority, a rarely
heated Justice Alito, an exquisitely erudite Justice Thomas, and the first
time that Chief Justice Roberts ever felt so aggrieved as to necessitate read-
ing excerpts of his dissent from the bench itself. Without delving into the
Fourteenth Amendment merits, suffice it to say that there is plenty of intel-
lectual heft—onto which it would be fully appropriate for judicial
supremacy opponents to latch—to the constitutional position of the
Obergefell dissenters.
Secondly, there is the reality that strong policy arguments against
same-sex marriage today are far more historically plausible and morally
defensible than were policy arguments against desegregation in the 1950s.
In the United States, antimiscegenation laws and Jim Crow laws, more gen-
erally, were inconsistent with the common law inherited from England and
spawned in the “modern period” as part of an “insidious movement that
denied the fundamental equality and dignity of all human beings and forci-
bly segregated citizens.”100 Indeed, Professor Francis Beckwith of Baylor
University notes that “the overwhelming consensus among scholars is that
the reason for these laws was to enforce racial purity, an idea that begins its
cultural ascendancy with the commencement of race-based slavery of Afri-
cans in early 17th century America and eventually receives the imprimatur
of ‘science’ when the eugenics movement comes of age in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.”101
In contrast, civil marriage was almost perennially and universally un-
derstood throughout human history as the union of one man and one woman
until the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex nuptials
in 2000.102 Laws affirming the traditional, conjugal definition of marriage
98. Id. at 204 (Coleman, J., objecting).
99. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 3.
100. Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage, Reason, and Religious Liberty: Much Ado About Sex,
Nothing to Do with Race, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/re
search/reports/2014/04/marriage-reason-and-religious-liberty-much-ado-about-sex-nothing-to-do-
with-race.
101. Id. (quoting Francis Beckwith, Interracial Marriage and Same-Sex Marriage, PUB. DIS-
COURSE (May 21, 2010), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/05/1324).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 808 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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thus did not arise out of spite or animus, but out of the overwhelming mil-
lennia-old consensus amongst thinkers as disparate as Jewish, Christian,
Muslim, ancient Greek, ancient Roman, and Enlightenment era alike that
marriage was intrinsically defined as the union of one man and one wo-
man.103 These disparate cultures often held wildly divergent views on the
morality of homosexual activity itself, yet all independently arrived at the
conclusion that marriage is an inherently child-oriented—and not adult ro-
mance-oriented—union whose only natural legal definition is to comprise
one man and one woman.104 Thus, while 1950s segregationists defended an
institutionally racist de facto caste system that was anathema to the com-
mon law, conjugal marriage proponents today merely espouse the view
unanimously accepted by canon, common, civil, ancient Greek, and ancient
Roman law.105 That viewpoint, furthermore, was also adopted by popular
initiative by the nation’s largest blue state106 and was ostensibly publicly
defended by liberal President Barack Obama as recently as his 2008 presi-
dential campaign.
* * * * *
The embedded assumption in Part II of this paper has been that the
APP Statement and Southern Manifesto make for an important comparison
in part due to the paucity of such similar comprehensive antijudicial author-
ity statements issued between March 1956 and November 2015.107 Such an
assumption is indeed borne out by history, but it is important to try to
understand why judicial supremacy has so largely prevailed in its recur-
ring methodological tug of war with departmentalism and popular
constitutionalism.
103. See Anderson, supra note 100.
104. See Sherif Girgis, Robert P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What Is Marriage?, 34 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 247 (2011) (“[M]arriage is the type of social practice whose basic con-
tours can be discerned by our common human nature, whatever our religious backgrounds.”).
105. See Anderson, supra note 100.
106. In 2008, California’s Proposition Eight popular ballot initiative, which affirmed the tradi-
tional definition of civil marriage, passed 52.24% to 47.76%.
107. There have certainly been instances of notable singular political actors urging judicial
defiance or constitutional resistance, however. For example, in the aftermath of Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962), which held that government-directed public school prayer runs afoul of the
First Amendment’s establishment clause, South Carolina Senator Olin Johnston encouraged South
Carolinians to openly defy the Court: “Despite the Supreme Court ruling, I am urging school
teachers and schools to continue the reading of the Bible and to continue praying in the class-
rooms.” J. K. Sweeney, Public Education In A ‘Religious State’: South Carolina Responds to
Engel v. Vitale (1962), Abington v. Schempp (1963), and Murray v. Curle (1963), SCHOLAR
COMMONS (Jan. 1, 2013), http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2237&con
text=etd.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 19 16-APR-20 15:41
196 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:2
III. THE TRIUMPH OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
The seeming predominance of judicial supremacist sentiment amongst
both the legal academy and political arena today108 has made the APP
Statement all the more worthwhile. Certainly, Carolene Products’ famous
footnote four109 and the Earl Warren court’s famously progressive jurispru-
dence have, in the minds of many, solidified the idea of the judiciary as a
countermajoritarian guardian of the natural liberties secured by the Bill of
Rights.110 And it is easy to see how calls for judicial restraint, which have
deeply shaped post-Warren Court conservative jurisprudence and has been
an embedded part of the Federalist Society’s very mission,111 can lead to
antijudicial supremacist sentiment sometimes pigeonholed as a nostalgic
notion of a purportedly reactionary social conservative right.112 Regardless
of the cause, as one scholar has opined, it seems like “[s]ometime in the
past generation or so . . . Americans came to believe that the meaning of
their Constitution is something beyond their compass, something that
should be left to others.”113
I have identified what I believe are five main reasons why judicial
supremacy has become such a nearly universally accepted norm in the acad-
emy and political arena, and why explicitly antijudicial supremacy pleas
108. See Tom Donnelly, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the Stories We Tell
Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 960 (2009) (quoting LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEM-
SELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 232 (2004)) (proposing that there
have been “two generations of near consensus about judicial supremacy among intellectuals and
opinion-makers on both the left and the right (not to mention among high school civics
teachers)”).
109. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
110. See, e.g., Timothy E. Gammon, Equal Protection of the Laws and San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 435, 471 n.102 (1977) (quoting David A.J. Richards,
Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32 (1973)) (proposing that, where a “trained” and “independent” judiciary
is available and possesses a “special technique by which to interpret and enforce the fundamental
civil rights,” then a “certain amount of judicial supremacy in interpreting and enforcing the funda-
mental civil rights is also justifiable.”).
111. For example, my current Federalist Society membership card has printed on its back the
famous excerpt from Alexander Hamilton’s THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 in which he describes the
judiciary’s relative institutional impotence. See Hamilton, supra note 3.
112. As but two examples, Michael Stokes Paulsen and Robert P. George, both of whom have
been cited in this paper numerous times and are adamantly opposed to judicial supremacy, are
strongly pro-life Christians (Paulsen is an evangelical Protestant, and George is a Catholic). Fur-
thermore, Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court, perhaps the most iconic anti-
judicial supremacy jurist currently in any state court, is a devout Southern Baptist whose wife
Kayla serves as president of the Alabama-based socially conservative group, “Foundation for
Moral Law.” See Our Staff, FOUND. FOR MORAL LAW http://morallaw.org/our-staff/. But see
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000), for a prominent
counterexample of a left-leaning legal scholar—and, specifically, one identified with the socialis-
tic/Marxist-leaning “critical legal studies” movement—strongly opposing judicial supremacy and
concomitantly endorsing popular constitutionalism.
113. Donnelly, supra note 108, at 960 (quoting LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 229 (2004)).
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such as the APP Statement are so contemporarily rare. These five reasons
range from being more empirically grounded to being more speculative, but
all are worthy of careful consideration.
A. Judicial Supremacy’s Emerging Consensus Predates Cooper v.
Aaron and the Southern Manifesto
Though Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Chief Justice John
Marshall in Marbury alike all arguably considered judicial supremacy
anathema, there is actually substantial historical support for the notion that
judicial supremacist sentiment was widely pervasive well before the Su-
preme Court first explicitly pronounced it in Cooper.114 Indeed, US history
“is littered with debates over judicial authority and constitutional meaning,”
with “judicial authority. . . contested by important segments of the popu-
lace, from abolitionists to labor unions to segregationists to pro-life advo-
cates.”115 But the key word in the preceding sentence is “contested”:
judicial supremacy, after all, has always been a closely held belief by a
nonnegligible segment of the American populace. It was hotly contested
from the time of the Founding generation through the antebellum period,
emerged as powerfully pervasive by the turn of the twentieth century and
was already widely accepted by the legal and political elite by the time of
the Manifesto and Cooper.
Even before Marbury, Federalist Party criticisms of Jefferson and
Madison’s Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798–99 “overwhelm-
ingly . . . resorted to the assertion of judicial supremacy.”116 Indeed, “Fed-
eralist doctrine” viewed it as “self-evident” that the Constitution clearly
“removed questions of its own interpretation from the states and vested
them in the federal courts.”117 Since Alexander Hamilton himself was still a
prominent Federalist Party leader at the time, it is difficult to conclude that
his seminal antijudicial power writing in The Federalist No. 78 was ulti-
mately irreconcilable with such a unanimous party-line belief. This
projudicial power Federalist Party dogma was at loggerheads with the Jef-
fersonian and Madisonian opposition to judicial supremacy evinced in the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions; as the Democratic-Republican Party of
Jefferson and Madison broke off into various factions in the 1820s, its anti-
judicial supremacy intellectual progeny followed Andrew Jackson and be-
came a prominent trait of Jackson’s new Democratic Party.
More broadly, while Presidents Jefferson and Jackson staunchly ad-
hered to departmentalism both in theory and in practice, some antebellum
presidents subscribed to judicial supremacy for largely political calcula-
114. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
115. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 4.
116. Id. at 245.
117. Id. at 245–46.
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tions. Populist to its movement’s core, Jacksonian democracy was ardently
opposed to judicial supremacy. To the contrary, President James Buchanan
“was only too happy to oblige” to include language in his first inaugural
address to the effect that the slavery issue “must ultimately be decided by
the Supreme Court.”118 Buchanan’s avowed judicial supremacy was only
abetted by the Taney-led Court, whose unanimous ruling in 1859’s
Ableman v. Booth119 dealt narrowly with a habeas corpus dispute, but more
broadly asserted in dicta that the Constitution gives the judiciary the final
say in constitutional interpretation.120 In many ways, then, Ableman can be
seen as a direct precursor to the Cooper Court’s more explicit assertion of
judicial supremacy ninety-nine years later.
President Buchanan is not a historical outlier, even by antebellum stan-
dards. Indeed, American history has numerous examples of presidents all
too eager to defer to judicial authority because “for most national leaders
most of the time,” “judicial supremacy . . . [is] at worst an annoyance and at
best a godsend.”121 Judicial supremacy has more often been opposed by
more populist (e.g., Jackson) and transformative Article II-centric (e.g.,
Lincoln) presidents, but for many others, accepting judicial supremacy
often makes for good politics. Most presidents who are not true visionaries
likely only have a certain spectrum of core issues on which they are deeply
passionate and willing to exercise significant political capital;122 thus, “lim-
itations of vision or imagination on the part of certain presidents may [also]
account for their diffidence toward the Court.”123 Not every president, in
118. Id. at 253.
119. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859).
120. Id. at 517–18 (“But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could not peace-
fully be maintained, unless it was clothed with judicial power, equally paramount in authority to
carry it into execution; for if left to the courts of justice of the several States, conflicting decisions
would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals could hardly be expected to be always free
from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the Constitution and laws and treaties of
the United States, and the powers granted to the Federal Government, would soon receive differ-
ent interpretations in different States, and the Government of the United States would soon be-
come one thing in one State and another thing in another. It was essential, therefore, to its very
existence as a Government, that it should have the power of establishing courts of justice, alto-
gether independent of State power, to carry into effect its own laws; and that a tribunal should be
established in which all cases which might arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of
the United States, whether in a State court or a court of the United States, should be finally and
conclusively decided. Without such a tribunal, it is obvious that there would be no uniformity of
judicial decision; and that the supremacy, (which is but another name for independence,) so care-
fully provided in the clause of the Constitution above referred to, could not possibly be maintained
peacefully, unless it was associated with this paramount judicial authority.”).
121. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 287.
122. See, e.g., id. at 282 (noting that even while signing into law the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act, President George W. Bush “used the occasion to invite the Supreme Court to strike
down key provisions as unconstitutional” by writing in his signing statement that, “I expect that
the courts will resolve these legitimate legal questions as appropriate under the law.”).
123. Thomas W. Merrill, Book Reviews: The Political Foundation of Judicial Supremacy: The
Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History, 9 ENGAGE 1, 148
(2008) (reviewing KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-2\UST204.txt unknown Seq: 22 16-APR-20 15:41
2020] ANTI-OBERGEFELL & JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 199
other words, can be Andrew Jackson—let alone Abraham Lincoln. Not
every president necessarily cares about judicial power as much as Jackson
did, and certainly very few can so much as aspire to be as transformative as
was Lincoln.
One result of Lee’s surrender to Grant at Appomattox Court House
was the large-scale repudiation of nullification-based John C. Calhoun in-
terpretive theory,124 and many viewed “the defeat of the South in 1865 [as]
extinguish[ing] [the theory’s] vitality.”125 In Reconstruction and the late
nineteenth century, the politically dominant Republican Party largely ad-
hered to judicial supremacist sentiment: judicial authority was seen as insti-
tutionally harmonizing amidst such post-war internal strife.126 The rapidly
increasing industrialization of the United States only accelerated judicial
supremacy’s rise, as big business viewed as necessary “an integrated na-
tional market free from the interference of states and localities”; further-
more, the Supreme Court was “only too happy to fill” the “vacuum” left by
a Congress that had grave qualms about its Article I, Section 8 authority to
nationally regulate private enterprise.127 The Court’s “Lochner Era”128 saw
the Republican Party and economic conservatives only clamor harder for
judicial authority, while it was left to populist Democrats like William Jen-
nings Bryan to push back against perceived “judicial oligarchy.”129 The
emergence of a late-nineteenth century partisan mirror image of the 1858
debates between the fiercely antijudicial supremacy Republican, Lincoln,
and the pro-judicial supremacy Democrat, Douglas, demonstrates, moreo-
ver, that this particular debate has not been aired throughout our history
along strictly partisan lines.130
The early twentieth century saw a continuation of much of the same.
President William McKinley’s sweeping victory in the 1900 election was
largely understood as a popular vote in favor of judicial authority.131 With
President Theodore Roosevelt’s emerging Progressive Era domestic
THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
(2007)).
124. See generally Paulsen, supra note 65.
125. Hagley, supra note 43, at 193. But see WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 181 (noting that
Democratic President Andrew Johnson, in the aftermath of the Civil War, still encouraged popular
constitutionalism: “the Constitution ‘is again unfolded, and the people are invited to read and
understand it, and to maintain its provisions’ against transient factions.”).
126. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 183, 255 (noting that Republican President
Ulysses Grant viewed a “judicial remedy” as one means of resolving an Article I versus Article II
separation of powers dispute).
127. Friedman & Delaney, supra note 43, at 1159.
128. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
129. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 258.
130. To further indicate the lack of partisan lines of this particular debate in the late-nineteenth
century, consider that Democratic President Grover Cleveland had “small-government inclina-
tions” that “complemented and enriched” the emergence of the Lochner era’s distinctly laissez-
faire jurisprudence. Id. at 229.
131. Id. at 259.
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agenda, judicial supremacy “acquired new dimensions” when it emerged as
a natural response to the “perceived need to rein in the increasingly active
political branches of government.”132 Americans came to see the new polit-
ical landscape’s muddled and “unruly” electoral coalitions as necessarily
ill-suited to settle constitutional disputes.133 Frustrated by the Lochner era
courts impeding his imposed progressivism, Roosevelt eventually went
“haywire” and espoused “unconstrained majoritarianism” in his fiercely an-
tijudicial power 1912 third-party presidential run;134 his defeat at the polls
was thus yet another victory for judicial authority.135
President Calvin Coolidge, as a leading laissez-faire Republican of the
Lochner Era, was very much a proponent of judicial supremacy.136 Even
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s decision to try to “pack” the Su-
preme Court in 1937 can be understood as a tacit capitulation to judicial
supremacy; though Roosevelt was an unambiguous proponent of a powerful
executive branch, such a court-packing scheme is likely not the course he
would have steered if he believed a president would be duly justified in
flatly refusing to either ad hoc enforce or accept as binding political princi-
ple a judicial diktat with which he disagreed. As the nation entered World
War II against European and Japanese fascism, subsequently, judicial au-
thority came to be seen domestically “as the authoritative guardian[ ] of
liberty that distinguished American democracy from European dictator-
ships.”137 And finally, President Harry Truman’s decision to meekly abide
the court’s anti-Article II power ruling in The Steel Seizure Case138 ce-
mented judicial supremacy as mainstream presidential sentiment.
All in all, then, judicial supremacist sentiment has always been a sub-
ject of debate throughout the republic. It was closely contested in the early
years, and indeed was bitterly contested in the antebellum period between
the era of Jacksonian democracy and Lincoln’s ultimate presidential ascen-
sion. Judicial supremacy became quite pervasive in the laissez-faire period
of the late nineteenth century, and, notwithstanding President Theodore
132. Id. at 284.
133. Id.
134. George F. Will, Opinion, George Will: Texas’s Ted Cruz Gives Tea Party a Madisonian
Flair, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-texass-
ted-cruz-gives-tea-party-a-madisonian-flair/2012/08/01/gJQApiwePX_story.html.
135. Democrat Woodrow Wilson, the iconic Progressive and presidential victor in 1912 over
both Roosevelt and the incumbent William Taft, was also a judicial supremacist. See Robert
Lowry Clinton, Elitism and Judicial Supremacy, PUB. DISCOURSE (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www
.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/10/1742 (noting that Wilson embraced judicial supremacy, describ-
ing the courts as “instruments of the nation’s growth,” that by determining “what powers are to be
exercised under the Constitution . . . determine also the adequacy of the Constitution in respect of
the needs and interests of the nation”).
136. See Whittington, supra note 3, at 265.
137. Id. at 271 (quoting RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 177–224
(1999)).
138. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Roosevelt’s prominent antijudicial power third-party presidential run in
1912, had indeed become “widespread”139 accepted sentiment in the lead-
up to the Southern Manifesto140 and the Cooper Court’s 1958 unapologetic
aggrandizement. It is, thus, little surprise that powerful doctrinal opposition
to judicial supremacy, such as that found in the APP Statement, is so rarely
given voice today.
B. Largely Left-Leaning Legal and Political Elites Have Supported
Judicial Supremacy as a Counter-Majoritarian Protector of
Individual Rights
Many of the Constitution’s framers foresaw the judiciary, with its lack
of democratic accountability and life-tenured judges, as a uniquely counter-
majoritarian institution to help temper the excesses of plebiscitary democ-
racy.141 The rise of political parties shortly after the American founding
only further emphasized the need for such a countermajoritarian guardian,
as “the President and Congress [were] beholden to the coalitions of interest
groups that put them in power and sustain[ed] them thereafter.”142
In the twentieth century, as the Lochner Era faded, Carolene Products’
famous footnote four143 provided progressives and those on the political left
with a new twist on this founding-era thought. For many on the legal left
today, including the American Constitution Society,144 Carolene Products’
footnote four still serves as something closely approximating a doctrinal
guidepost for the judiciary’s highest and noblest function: to preclude
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”145 The Lochner era had
soured progressives on judicial authority, but the famous footnote four
helped ensure that “many of the Left [came to] prefer[ ] unreliable judicial
protection of constitutional rights to no judicial protection at all.”146 Minor-
139. Driver, supra note 66, at 1058.
140. The Southern Manifesto was itself largely premised (however counter-intuitively) on ju-
dicial supremacy. See generally Driver, supra note 66.
141. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the problem of
“factions”).
142. Merrill, supra note 123, at 149.
143. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“Prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
144. As a personal aside, when I attended the American Constitution Society’s introductory
talk my 1L year at the University of Chicago Law School, Professor Geoffrey Stone went out of
his way to emphasize the importance of this footnote to the society’s very mission.
145. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
146. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 270. The contemporary left’s affinity for such judicial
authority in the realm of majority-minority relations is, of course, undermined by the historical
reality that very similar arguments were employed at the time of the Civil War by southern seces-
sionists. See Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1276 (quoting Professor Harry Jaffa) (“The Constitution
had established the Supreme Court as the arbiter between the [majority and the minority],” and
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ity free speech and religion were seen as too important not to judicially
protect.147
The Warren Court’s famous minority rights-protecting progressive de-
cisions, including those dealing with desegregation, were seen by many as
juridical culminations from footnote four’s provenance. Overall, “the Jus-
tices were seen by some as the final bulwark of constitutional liberty,” and
liberal fear of European-style fascism coming to America likely made “the
middle classes more ready to accept the Court’s guardianship of civil liber-
ties.”148 To this day, the Left’s near universal acceptance of judicial
supremacy is still largely tied to this normative belief in the judiciary’s
purpose and function.149
The left-leaning legal academy’s near consensus150 on judicial
supremacy has even substantially affected the discussion on the legal right.
The broader intellectual community of the Federalist Society, a group
largely founded in explicit opposition to the perceived juridical excesses of
the progressive Warren court, is itself now largely split amongst more “con-
servative” projudicial restraint originalists151 and more “libertarian” pro-
“judicial engagement” originalists.152 Many notable libertarian originalists,
such as Ilya Somin, defend judicial supremacy in explicit terms;153 others,
such as the Institute for Justice’s Evan Bernick, choose to recouch judicial
supremacy as a more anodyne “judicial co-equality.”154 These libertarians
doctrinally depart rather dramatically from the projudicial restraint jurispru-
dence and rhetoric of the conservative Judge Robert Bork and the depart-
mentalism of Justice Antonin Scalia.155 It is wrong to equate the judicial
restraint/“judicial engagement” debate as having entirely equivalent bound-
aries with the judicial supremacy/departmentalism debate,156 but there is
“[i]f the antislavery majority refused to accept that arbitration, then it refused to accept the
Constitution.”).
147. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 269.
148. Friedman & Delaney, supra note 43, at 1172–73.
149. See, e.g., Pestritto, supra note 8, at 67; accord Gammon, supra note 110, at 471 n.102.
150. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 108, at 960.
151. See, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, Judicial Restraint, (At Least) As Old as Judicial Review
Itself, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 16, 2015, 7:50 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/3965
53/judicial-restraint-least-old-judicial-review-itself-matthew-j-franck.
152. See, e.g., Evan Bernick, Rand Paul Is Right: Judicial Restraint Is Wrong, NAT’L REV.
(Jan. 15, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/396416/rand-paul-right-judici
al-restraint-wrong-evan-bernick.
153. See Ilya Somin, Defending Judicial Supremacy, WASH. POST (June 1, 2015), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/01/defending-judicial-supremacy/
(“[S]uch exceptional cases [as those Lincoln faced] should not lead us to reject the importance of
adhering to the Constitution as a general rule—or to reject judicial supremacy.”).
154. Evan Bernick, Judicial Co-Equality Is Not Judicial Supremacy: Why the Judiciary Has
the Final Say in Constitutional Disputes, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2015, 5:31 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/evan-bernick/judicial-co-equality-is-n_b_7488136.html.
155. See George, supra note 92.
156. For example, the well-known constitutional theorist Hadley Arkes of Amherst College is
a proponent of both “judicial engagement” and departmentalism.
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usually strong overlap. One prominent result of this bifurcation in right-of-
center jurisprudence has been to largely cabin antijudicial supremacy senti-
ment to social conservative circles.157
Whether it is traditionally at home on the post-Carolene Products/
Warren court legal left or more recently at home on the rational basis test-
opposing libertarian right, then, judicial authority is seen by many as a nec-
essary means to protect certain rights normatively deemed especially wor-
thy of the utmost protection. Furthermore, there is increasingly less of an
ideological/partisan split on the issue, compared to earlier times in Ameri-
can history such as the turn of the twentieth century;158 projudicial senti-
ment couched in the language of countermajoritarianism is not cabined to
just the political left.159
C. For Many, It is Difficult to Separate the Judicial Supremacy Debate
from the Twentieth Century Desegregation Fights
When many contemporarily think of defiance of judicial authority, the
images that come to mind are less frequently Lincoln ignoring Dred Scott to
issue passports to blacks in western US territories, and more frequently fed-
eral troops escorting black schoolchildren in the South over the screams of
white racists.160 While the worth of a constitutional doctrine, including the
157. See, e.g., Gammon, supra note 110, at 440. Robert P. George is fond of comparing Roe v.
Wade to Dred Scott, both on the merits of the abortion/slavery comparison and for the fact that
substantive due process was both times the purported Fourteenth Amendment constitutional ratio-
nale. See Robert P. George, “A Republic. . .If You Can Keep It,” FIRST THINGS (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2016/01/a-republic-if-you-can-keep-it; see also
Robert P. George & William L. Saunders, Republicans and the Relics of Barbarism, NAT’L REV.
(Aug. 30, 2004, 6:23 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2004/08/republicans-and-relics-bar
barism-robert-p-george-william-l-saunders/. For judicial supremacy as a political cudgel, see Josh
Hammer, Ted Cruz is Right About Marco Rubio on Same-Sex Marriage, REDSTATE (Feb. 15,
2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.redstate.com/diary/josh_hammer/2016/02/15/ted-cruz-right-marco-
rubio-sex-marriage/ (arguing that Senator Marco Rubio’s public comments following
Obergefell—“[w]hile I disagree with this decision, we live in a republic and must abide by the
law”—evinced an insufficiently strong opposition to the Supreme Court’s decision).
158. Recall that, around that time, Republicans and economic conservatives were overwhelm-
ingly supportive of stauncher judicial authority, while populists and progressives, such as William
Jennings Bryan and Theodore Roosevelt, were not.
159. See, e.g., Evan Bernick, Cooper v. Aaron and Judicial Authority: Lessons From Little
Rock, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/evan-bernick/
cooper-v-aaron-and-judici_b_8233796.html (“The judiciary, owing to its comparative insulation
from majoritarian pressures, is less likely than other organs of government to take the majority’s
view of the minority’s rights or cave in the face of majoritarian tyranny.”).
160. On a personal note, I recall being very moved in sixth grade when I first saw Norman
Rockwell’s 1964 painting, The Problem We All Live With, which depicts six-year-old black girl
Ruby Bridges being escorted to school in New Orleans by four deputy U.S. marshals. I wrote a
poem about the painting, at the time, entitled Southern Inhospitality, which I still have saved on
my computer. At the risk of embarrassment, here is what I wrote: “A frightened black child on her
way to school, Knowing that her destiny is where white people rule. Guarded by strangers every
step of the way, To protect her from a world unfortunately cruel./ Her intelligence has given her
entry today, Which is kind of ironic, if I do say, For what is supposed to be a happy event Has
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distinctly interpretive question of judicial supremacy, should not be adjudi-
cated based on how sundry political actors use or misuse it, there is little
doubt that it has often been hard to extricate the esoteric judicial supremacy
debate from such viscerally searing images.161 Legal scholars have actually
sometimes even been loath to analyze judicial supremacy precisely due to
this deeply unfortunate connection,162 which is certainly intellectually dis-
appointing and does an academic disservice to the legacy of morally heroic
opponents of judicial supremacy—such as Lincoln himself. Nonetheless,
Justin Driver opines that these terrible images form such a “synecdoche” for
segregationist obstinacy that “[t]o the extent that citizens today are inclined
to express vehement disagreement with judicial decisions after they are ini-
tially issued, it would not be surprising if they often muted their reactions in
order to avoid resembling the widely reviled opponents of racial integration
during the post-Brown era.”163 As judicial supremacy and “aversion to
white supremacy” have “become fused in the minds of many Ameri-
cans,”164 there is little doubt that such a fusion has been to the long-term
detriment of both judicial supremacy’s theoretical potency and its popular
appeal.
D. There are Compelling Pragmatic and Functionalist Reasons to
Contemporarily Support Judicial Supremacy
While theorists such as Michael Stokes Paulsen see little harm in let-
ting various constitutional actors interpret the Constitution for themselves
within their own semisovereign spheres of influence, pragmatists, function-
alists, and even many formalists concerned with general rule of law
turned into a miserable day./ Oh, I’m sure in this girl’s mind there was left a very sizable dent;
Unfortunately, that was not what was supposed to be meant. School should be a place where you
can learn and expand your mind; Not where you feel other children’s resent./ The world should be
a place where people love, forgive, and be kind. This little girl should leave this dreadful memory
behind. People’s ignorance is regrettably easy to find, Yet trying to find a cure for this ignorance
is hard on the mind.” Poem by Josh Hammer, (on file with author).
161. See, e.g., Judge Wiley Branton, Jr., Reflections on the Commemoration of the 50th Anni-
versary of the Crisis at Little Rock Central High School, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 313,
318 (2008) (“A particularly troubling and unforgettable image, and one that I submit should live
in infamy forever, is that of Elizabeth Eckford—a young black teenager dressed in a clean and
fresh pressed dress, ready for her first day at a new school—facing the angry white mob all by
herself. Eventually, a white lady of courage came to her assistance. That incident was utterly
shameful and unforgivable.”); see also David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065, 1082 (2008) (“The televised images of frenzied crowds of white adults
abusing black schoolchildren were very dramatic.”).
162. See, e.g., Driver, supra note 66, at 1056 (“Law professors have, with a negligible number
of exceptions, approached the legal materials advocating white resistance to Brown as though they
contained some sort of racial contagion and that the best way to avoid contracting racial prejudice
is to keep materials exhibiting such prejudice at bay.”).
163. Id. at 1131–32.
164. Id. at 1132.
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norms165 have reason to be skeptical of a possible “every man a law unto
himself” result.166 Constitutional authority Daniel Webster was very ner-
vous about this result: he opined that the Constitution “in the hands of mul-
tiple ‘popular bodies, each at liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to
respect the decisions of others’” would not be “fit to be called a govern-
ment.”167 Instead, Webster contended the Constitution would then be “a
collection of topics, for everlasting controversy.”168 Stephen Douglas raised
its specter during his debates with Lincoln,169 and Senator Lehman of New
York did the same during the Senate floor colloquy on the Southern Mani-
festo.170 Moreover, President Eisenhower’s decision to send federal troops
into Little Rock was largely based on his own belief that “the rejection of
judicial supremacy [w]as an invitation to anarchy.”171 Most recently, liber-
tarian originalist Evan Bernick has analogized the rejection of judicial
supremacy as “get[ting] a glimpse of the dangers that [John] Locke per-
ceived in the state of nature,” and thus “risk[ing the] creat[ion of] an uncer-
tain and dangerous state of affairs.”172
In the aftermath of Obergefell, the judicial supremacy debate memora-
bly took the partial shape of the controversy surrounding Kim Davis, a
county clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky. In August 2015, Davis cited her
Christian faith as precluding her from issuing same-sex marriage licenses
and was then subjected to a district court order directing her to do so. She
was subsequently jailed for contempt of court before being ultimately re-
leased. Davis has been partially vindicated by the Kentucky state legislature
165. See Bernick, supra note 159 (arguing that rejecting Cooper would mean “the rule of law
could not be preserved.”).
166. While perhaps not directly on point, even Madison warned in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10
that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias
his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 141
(Madison).
167. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting 6 REG. DEB. 78 (1830) (statement of Sen.
Daniel Webster)).
168. Id.
169. See Paulsen, supra note 41, at 1258–59 (quoting Stephen Douglas, Third Lincoln-Doug-
las Debate, Jonesboro, Illinois (Sept. 15, 1858), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
1832–1858, at 633–34 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989)). Stephen Douglas asked Lincoln, “Is
every man in this land allowed to resist decisions he does not like, and only support those that
meet his approval?” Paulsen’s own response to Douglas is that “the idea that judicial decisions
might legitimately be resisted by the political branches is not an invitation to ‘chaos,’” but “can be
seen as a logical, even desirable, consequence of the separation of powers and attendant checks
and balances, applied to the shared incidental power of constitutional interpretation.”
170. See Driver, supra note 66, at 1106–07 (quoting 102 CONG. REC. 4550 (1956) (statement
of Sen. Herbert Lehman)  “Shall each individual in our Nation have the right to say that he dis-
agrees with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution and, therefore, will not abide
by the . . . Supreme Court? Obviously, that would be anarchy, and our Nation would collapse in
chaos and disorder.”).
171. Id. at 1117.
172. Bernick, supra note 154.
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and governor since her jailing,173 but her dramatic ordeal made national
headlines and presented the public with a view as to what precisely the sort
of mass public officeholder “constitutional resistance” to which the APP
Statement alludes might look like in practice. Suffice it to say that, while
antijudicial supremacy and proreligious liberty Republican Party presiden-
tial candidates Mike Huckabee and Ted Cruz celebrated Davis,174 many
constitutional pragmatists and functionalists assuredly did not.
Most recently, controversial Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice
Roy Moore was charged with six counts of violating judicial ethics by the
Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission in early May 2016, for issuing a
post-Obergefell order that nonetheless blocked Alabama probate judges
from issuing marriage licenses for same-sex couples statewide.175 In charg-
ing Moore, the Commission alleged that he had “flagrantly disregarded and
abused his authority” and “abandoned his role as a neutral and detached
chief administrator of the judicial system.”176 Some notable social conserv-
atives have arisen in Moore’s defense,177 while some progressive-leaning
groups have lambasted him.178 Such incidents as Moore’s only threaten to
further ossify the contemporary judicial supremacy debate along social con-
servative versus progressive lines, perhaps further confining opposition to
judicial supremacy to a narrower slice of the American citizenry and only
aiding the long-term interests of pro-judicial supremacy functionalists.
E. Due to Justices’ Life Tenure, the Supreme Court Enjoys Peculiar
Institutional Capital
One final possible explanation for the long-term triumph of judicial
supremacy is that the US Supreme Court, by virtue of being comprised of
173. See, e.g., Leah Barkoukis, Kim Davis Just Won a Major Victory in Fight Over Gay
Marriage Licenses in Kentucky, TOWNHALL (Apr. 15, 2016, 8:10 AM), http://townhall.com/tip
sheet/leahbarkoukis/2016/04/15/kim-davis-just-won-fight-over-gay-marriage-licenses-in-kentuc
ky-n2148803 (“Kentucky Gov. Matt Bevin . . . signed a bill that removes the names of county
clerks from the state marriage license forms.”).
174. See, e.g., Tom LoBianco et al., Mike Huckabee Leads Kim Davis out of Kentucky Jail,
CNN (Sept. 8, 2015, 4:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/politics/kim-davis-kentucky-
clerk-2016-candidates-chris-christie.
175. See Matt Ford, Roy Moore’s Last Stand?, THE ATLANTIC (May 7, 2016), http://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/roy-moore-alabama-ethics/481776/.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Michael Bryboski, Suspended Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore Wanted Clar-
ity in Gay Marriage Ruling, Conservative Says, CHRISTIAN POST (May 10, 2016), http://www
.christianpost.com/news/suspended-alabama-chief-justice-roy-moore-gay-marriage-ruling-conser
vative-163662/ (noting that Sam Rohrer of the American Pastors Network argued that this unfor-
tunate fallout of Obergefell evinced “another glaring example of the federal government exceed-
ing its authority and disturbing and upsetting the very important balance of power between the
federal government and the states.”).
178. See id. (noting that Richard Cohen of the Southern Poverty Law Center called Moore a
“religious zealot” and an “egomaniac”).
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justices whose tenures exceed twenty-six years, on average,179 may enjoy
“certain built-in advantages in the perennial struggle for political power.”180
While the two political branches are electorally checked amidst their often-
times partisan-fueled wrangling, the Court is uniquely positioned to play a
longer institutional game.181 In today’s age of frequent political gridlock, it
is intuitive to think of the judiciary as perhaps being above the quotidian
fray—and thus less narrowly self-interested as an institution. Moreover, the
fact that justices stay on the bench for far longer than do presidents and
most legislators may, quite simply, make them often more competent at
their jobs; their near unanimous composition of exceptionally bright attor-
neys and jurists might be viewed by the public as more specialized, elite,
and ultimately more trustworthy, wielding tremendous power. The judici-
ary’s lack of democratic accountability and isolation from plebiscitary de-
mands may empower the court with unique institutional capital simply not
available to the two other political branches. Overall, such institutional cap-
ital may allow the justices “to temper temporary individual advantage in
order to promote the interests of the institution, which are implicitly under-
stood to mean aggrandizement of its power relative to other institutions.”182
* * * * *
There are surely other possible explanations for the long-term triumph
of judicial supremacy in the legal academy and the political arena, besides
the five considered here. In particular, I think future research should focus
on elementary through high-school age civics curricula and analyze as
much as possible how uniformly (perhaps even subconsciously) in favor of
judicial supremacy such curricula indeed are.
IV. CONCLUSION
The public debate over judicial supremacy is, quite literally, as old as
the republic itself. Far from being required by either constitutional structure
or the Article III text, there is a strong argument that judicial supremacy is
not only not required, but is indeed actually repudiated by the Constitu-
tion’s structure, text and the landmark Marbury decision itself. Some early
presidents, such as Jefferson and Jackson, were openly favorable toward
departmentalism; Lincoln, in his 1858 Douglas debates’ rhetoric, and ulti-
mately in practice as president, took opposition to judicial supremacy all the
179. See Merrill, supra note 123, at 149.
180. Id.
181. A prime example of this strategy being deployed can be seen in Chief Justice John Rob-
erts, Jr., who oftentimes has engaged in a two-step jurisprudence where he will first warn about
the possible unconstitutionality of a federal statute, and then strike it down in the second instance.
In the context of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, see Northwest Austin Mun. Util. District No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). See also Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
182. Merrill, supra note 123, at 149.
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way to its logical conclusion both by defying Dred Scott as political princi-
ple and refusing to enforce the specific judgment in Ex parte Merryman. By
the turn of the twentieth century, laissez-faire Republicans were projudicial
authority whereas populist Democrats were not; thus, the partisan mirror
image from the Lincoln-Douglas debates demonstrates that the judicial
supremacy debate transcends political parties. Today, opposition to judicial
supremacy has largely, but not exclusively,183 been cabined to social con-
servative elements of the political right.
The APP Statement is extraordinarily bold not for its stance on the
doctrinal merits of either Obergefell or judicial supremacy more broadly,
but for being such an outlier amidst a rising consensus of judicial suprema-
cist sentiment in both the legal academy and the political arena. The APP
Statement is both more and less audacious than its most superficially natu-
ral predecessor, the Southern Manifesto of 1956: it is much more stridently
and explicitly opposed to judicial authority, but it is simultaneously more
normatively defensible as a political tool both due to the deeply split nature
of the Obergefell Court and to the much stronger moral defensibility of
taking a strong policy stand against same-sex marriage in 2015 than there
was for taking an equivalently strong stand against school desegregation in
1956.
Thus far, it seems that no sitting federal or state officeholders have
cited the APP Statement as a means to not apply Obergefell.184 And yet, at
minimum, the Statement still greatly contributes to the public discourse by
means of proffering an older, perhaps almost nostalgic, legal argument so
rarely heard today. Thus, while I am personally deeply sympathetic to the
Statement on the merits, I think everyone should at least appreciate its ad-
ding intellectual diversity to contemporary erudite constitutional discourse.
183. For an example of a prominent left-wing scholar staunchly opposing judicial supremacy,
see, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 112.
184. See also REPUBLICAN PARTY OF TEXAS, REPORT OF THE PERMANENT COMMITTEE ON
PLATFORM AND RESOLUTIONS 12 (2016) (“We believe [Obergefell v. Hodges], overturning the
Texas law prohibiting same sex marriage in Texas, has no basis in the Constitution and should be
reversed . . . The Governor and other elected officials of the state of Texas should assert our Tenth
Amendment right and reject the Supreme Court ruling.”) (emphasis added).
